SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Juan Lin Xing, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of an April 19, 2012, order of the BIA, affirming an October 7, 2010, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Juan Lin Xing, No. A088 652 036 (B.I.A. Apr. 19, 2012), aff'g No. A088 652 036 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 7, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision, including the portions not explicitly discussed by the BIA. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). For applications like this one, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of her account, and inconsistencies in her statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 265 (B.I.A. 2007). Analyzed under these standards, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence.

*165 The IJ reasonably relied on the inconsistency between Xing’s testimony that she joined an underground church in China in 2007 and letters from her mother and her fellow church member, indicating that she joined the church in late 2008. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008). Xing’s explanations for this discrepancy, including that her friend had made a typographical error, were not so compelling as to require reversal of the IJ’s findings. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that an agency need not credit an applicant’s explanations for inconsistencies in the record unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so).

Furthermore, Xing does not challenge the agency’s finding that she failed to provide reasonably available corroboration of her claim, including evidence from her brother or her husband, both of whom allegedly attended her Christian church in New York. The absence of such evidence rendered Xing “unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question,” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007), and constituted an independent basis for denying her application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2009). Because the above reasons provide substantial evidence as needed to uphold the agency’s adverse credibility determination, we do not reach the agency’s other bases for its credibility finding. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976).

We also decline to reach whether the agency erred in its finding that Xing established no pattern or practice of persecution against Christians in China. The agency’s adverse credibility finding subverted Xing’s claim that she currently practiced Christianity as well as her claim to membership in the class of Christians in China, which is a prerequisite for her pattern or practice claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(B). In light of the agency’s properly supported adverse credibility and corroboration findings, it did not err in denying Xing’s applications for relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal is DENIED as moot.