SUMMARY ORDER

Xing Liu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 1, 2012, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Xing Liu, No. A200 026 204 (B.I.A. Aug. 1, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)). When the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).

An alien may file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(2). Although Liu’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than three years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I), there are no time limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The BIA did not err in finding that Liu’s decision to join the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) in the United States constituted a change in his personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of his motion to reopen. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008). Nor did the BIA err in finding that the evidence Liu submitted failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions because that evidence demonstrated that the Chinese government had continually banned the CDP and targeted its members since the time of Liu’s last hearing and did not indicate that conditions had worsened for similarly situated individuals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169.

As to Liu’s argument that he established changed country conditions in China based on letters stating that the Chinese government had become aware of his CDP activities in the United States, the BIA reasonably declined to credit the letters because they were unsworn and written by interested witnesses who were not subject to cross-examination. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006); see also In re H-L-H & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (finding that unsworn letters from the alien’s friends and family were insufficient to provide substantial support for the alien’s claims because they were interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination *71 (citations omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 133-38 (2d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. The pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.