SUMMARY ORDER

Geljen Sherpa, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks review of a November 4, 2011, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Geljen Sherpa, No. A099 928 380 (BIA Nov. 4, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of Sherpa’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Sherpa’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than two years after the agency’s final order of removal, there is no time limitation if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

We find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Sherpa failed to demonstrate materially changed conditions that would excuse the untimely filing, as the record evidence did not indicate a change in conditions in Nepal, but rather reflected a continuation of instability caused by the Maoists, which existed at the time of Sherpa’s merits hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I & N Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (noting that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions, the BIA “compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing *30 below”); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”).

Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in declining to give probative weight to Sherpa’s documents submitted in support of his motion, as the IJ had questioned Sherpa’s credibility in the underlying proceedings and the documents were not authenticated by any means. See Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-49 (2d Cir. 2007) (relying on the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus to conclude that the agency may decline to credit documentary evidence submitted with a motion to reopen by an alien who was found not credible in the underlying proceeding); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency); Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 404 (2d Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sherpa’s motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2) and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).