SUMMARY ORDER

Ranjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a December 22, 2011, decision of the BIA denying his third motion to reopen. In re Ranjit Singh, No. A076 728 530 (B.I.A. Dec. 22, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We have reviewed the BIA’s denial of Singh’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Singh’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than six years after the agency’s final order of removal, there is no time limitation if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

We find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Singh failed to demonstrate materially changed conditions that would excuse the untimely filing, as the record evidence did not indicate a change in India’s human rights practices but rather reflected a con *121 tinuation of poor conditions that existed at the time of Singh’s merits hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 258 (BIA 2007) (noting that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions, the BIA “comparefs] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below”); see also See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)(internal quotation marks omitted).

Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying reopening due to Singh’s failure to establish his prima facie eligibility for relief. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that in order to establish prima facie eligibility for relief in a motion to reopen, petitioner must show a “ ‘realistic chance’ ” of obtaining relief by “demonstrating that the proffered new evidence would likely alter the result in her case.”) (quoting Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2005)). Given Singh’s generalized assertions that he would be punished or killed by Indian police if removed to India, the BIA did not err in finding that his fear of future persecution was speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.