SUMMARY ORDER

Victor Jordan, pro se, appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The complaint alleges constitutional violations arising out of a state court eviction proceeding. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

The district court properly dismissed Jordan’s complaint because Jordan’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Pursuant to that doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). “[Tjhere are four requirements for the application of Rooker-Feldman (1) “the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court”; (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a “state-court judgment”; (8) the plaintiff must “invite district court review and rejection of that judgment”; and (4) “the state-court judgment must have been renderéd before the district court proceedings commenced.” See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (footnote, internal quotations, and alteration omitted).

These requirements are satisfied here. Jordan is seeking an order staying the enforcement of a state court warrant of eviction. Jordan’s claims against Judge Levine (alleged misconduct during the state court proceedings) and Marshal Lo-cascio (unconstitutional enforcement of the warrant of eviction) arise from and concern only the state court eviction judgment and were filed after that judgment was entered. District courts lack jurisdiction “over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (emphasis added).

A pro se complaint usually should not be dismissed without granting the plaintiff leave to amend. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). However, leave to amend is unnecessary if it would be futile. See id.

We have considered all of Jordan’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. The judgment of the district court is hereby affirmed.