SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Jamel Stevens, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s judgment dismissing, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint raising claims of deliberate indifference to his medical needs and deprivation of property without due process. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and construe the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is hable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. We read pro se complaints liberally with “special solicitude” and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that [they] suggest[].” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Stevens’s claims. We affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by Judge Furman in his thorough and well-reasoned Opinion of January 8, 2013. See Stevens v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 3808(JMF), 2013 WL 81327 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013).

We have considered all of Stevens’s arguments and find them to be without mer *112 it. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.