SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment and order of the district court be AFFIRMED.

Timothy C. Duran, pro se, appeals from the district court’s (1) judgment sua sponte dismissing his complaint as barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel and (2) order imposing a filing injunction and denying his motion to correct the judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

A district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a complaint as frivolous, even if the plaintiff pays a filing fee. See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000). An action is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

“Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Proctor v. LeClaire, 715 F.3d 402, 411 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

As the district court concluded, Duran’s complaint is barred by res judicata. The settlement in the earlier litigation was embodied in a final judgment on the merits. See Greenberg v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 968 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Settlements may also have preclu-sive effect.”). The present complaint raises anew issues that Duran previously raised; and the relationship is sufficiently close between the defendants in the earlier litigation and the defendants in the instant case. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa Naviera Santa S.A., 56 F.3d 359, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he principle of privity bars relitigation of the same cause of action against a new defendant known by a plaintiff at the time of the first suit where the new defendant has a sufficiently close relationship to the original defendant to justify preclusion.”). The district court did not err in refusing to allow Duran to amend, as amendment would have been futile in light of the pre-clusive effect of the prior litigation. See *600 Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).

“A district court may, in its discretion, impose sanctions against litigants who abuse the judicial process.” Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996). “[I]n determining whether or not to restrict a litigant’s future access to the courts” through a filing injunction, the court “should consider the following factors: (1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties.” See Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986). Before a filing injunction is imposed, however, a litigant must be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1998). We review an order imposing a filing injunction for abuse of discretion. See Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 266 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Robert v. Dep’t of Justice, 439 Fed.Appx. 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (drawing same conclusion from Gollomp and Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters).

The district court did not abuse discretion in imposing the filing injunction. As the record demonstrates: (1) the district court notified Duran of the possible injunction and provided him with an opportunity to respond; (2) Duran filed four other actions in connection with the same condominium construction project; and (3) Duran is prevented only from filing future complaints in the Southern District of New York related to that same condominium construction project, cf. Safir, 792 F.2d at 25 (injunction precluding a litigant from “instituting any action whatsoever” was “overly broad”).

Finally, Duran was not prejudiced by any reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) in the district court’s judgment. Duran did not move for in forma pauperis status in the district court and has not done so on appeal.

We have considered Duran’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. The judgment and order of the district court are hereby affirmed.