SUMMARY ORDER

Krzysztof Piotrowski, a native and citizen of Poland, seeks review of a December 19, 2012, decision of the BIA, affirming the June 28, 2011, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for a waiver based on the existence of a good faith marriage under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4). 1 In re Krzysztof Piotrowski, No. A047 842 391 (B.I.A. Dec. 19, 2012), aff'g No. A047 842 391 (Immig. Ct. Hartford, CT, June 28, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

DISCUSSION

Where, as here, “the BIA. adopts the decision of the IJ and merely supplements the Id’s decisions ... we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA.” Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). Because Piotrowski challenges the denial of a discretionary waiver, our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (limiting jurisdiction to review discretionary denials); id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (stating exceptions for constitutional claims and questions of law); § 1186a(c)(4) (committing to the Secretary of Homeland Security sole discretion to make credibility determinations and the weight to be afforded to the evidence). See also Contreras-Salinas v. Holder, 585 F.3d 710, 713-14 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that § 1186a(c)(4) precludes review of credibility and evidentiary weight determinations).

Piotrowski argues that the IJ ignored his explanation that the inconsistencies between his testimony and statements during a prior agency interview were the result of the lack of an interpreter at his interview. To the contrary, both the IJ and the BIA explicitly considered that explanation and rejected it in their respective decisions. The record, therefore, does not support Piotrowski’s contention that the agency ignored evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e presume that an IJ has taken into account all of the evidence before him, unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.”).

Piotrowski also contends that the IJ erred by relying solely on the inconsistencies in his evidence regarding his and his ex-wife’s residences to deny his application, rather than considering their intent to establish a life together at the time they were married. Although, as Piotrowski asserts, the central issue in determining whether a marriage is bona fide is the couple’s “inten[t] to establish a life togeth *79 er at the time of marriage,” Boluk v. Holder, 642 F.3d 297, 303 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted), the IJ may consider the course of the marriage thereafter, including whether the couple cohabitated, 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e)(2)(ii). The IJ did not, therefore, err in considering whether Piotrowski and his ex-wife resided together during their marriage to determine his eligibility for a waiver. See id.

Piotrowski’s arguments go solely to the IJ’s determination of “what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence,” 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4), and do not raise a colorable constitutional claim or question of law. See Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e lack jurisdiction to review any legal argument that is so insubstantial and frivolous as to be inadequate to invoke federal-question jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review his petition. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4); Contreras-Salinas, 585 F.3d at 713-14.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.