SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Kenneth J. Phelan, pro se, appeals from the district court’s February 14, 2012 Amended Memorandum-Decision and Order adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the court grant Ap-pellees’ motion to dismiss Appellant’s amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoners’ rights complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, as a sanction for Appellant’s failure to submit to a deposition. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal, for abuse of discretion, and the factual findings made in support of the district court’s decision for clear error. See S. New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 143 (2d Cir. 2010). “[I]n evaluating a district court’s exercise of discretion to dismiss an action under Rule 37,” this Court has considered: “(1) the willfulness of the non-compliant party or the reason for noncompliance; (2) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of the period of noncompliance, and (4) whether the non-compliant party had been warned of the consequences of ... noncompliance.” Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp., 555 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also S. New England Tel. Co., 624 F.3d at 144 (noting that “these factors are not exclusive, and they need not each be resolved against the party challenging the district court’s sanctions for [this Court] to conclude that those sanctions were within the [district] court’s discretion”). Where a plaintiff appears pro se, dismissal with prejudice may be imposed only if “a warning has been given that noncompliance can result in dismissal.” Valentine v. Museum of Modern Art, 29 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

Reviewing the record in light of these principles, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the amended complaint. Appellant willfully refused to comply with the magistrate judge’s discovery orders, including the court’s orders *16 requiring Appellant to submit to a deposition. Despite Appellant’s claims on appeal that he did not refuse to appear, the record establishes that he told counsel for some of the Appellees not to travel to the prison for the deposition because he would refuse to be deposed. The first factor thus weighs against Appellant. See Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 302.

Turning to the second factor, the district court properly determined that lesser sanctions were unavailable or would not have been effective. Further, Appellant’s failure to submit to the deposition occurred approximately seven months after the initial discovery order, and after the discovery period had been extended to allow for the deposition. See id. at 300-03 (finding that dismissal was proper when the initial scheduling order was issued in October 2006 and the plaintiff failed to appear for his third scheduled deposition in April 2007). Finally, the magistrate judge twice advised Appellant that failure to submit to a deposition could result in the dismissal of his complaint; the fourth factor weighs against Appellant. See id. at 302-03.

Because the district court properly dismissed Appellant’s complaint, his challenges to the magistrate judge’s other discovery orders, the denial of his motion for class-action status, and the denial of his motion to amend the complaint, 1 are moot. Finally, to the extent Appellant argues that the magistrate judge was biased against him, we find no basis to conclude that any bias warranting recusal existed. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (regarding the standard for recu-sal).

We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s February 8, 2012 Memorandum-Decision and Order, as amended on February 14, 2012, is hereby AFFIRMED.