SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald S. Hedlund, pro se, appeals from an award of summary judgment in favor of his current employer, New York City Transit Authority (“NYC-TA”), in sexual harassment, religious discrimination, and retaliation action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VH”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, and the National Transit Systems Security Act (“NTSSA”), 6 U.S.C. § 1142. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). “In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Summary judgment is. appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Having conducted a de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons set forth in its October 13, 2011 memorandum decision and order.

On appeal, Hedlund challenges the district court’s determination' that he failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliation in connection with his disciplinary actions for sleeping on the job on November 6, 2007, and recklessly throwing a metal object near other NYCTA employees on March 11, 2008. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must show: “(1) his participation in protected activity; (2) defendant’s knowledge thereof; (3) materially adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 568 n. 6 (2d Cir. 2011); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1982.104(e)(2) (establishing the same requirements for retaliation claims under the NTSSA).

While Hedlund argues that his disciplinary action for sleeping on the job on November 6, 2007, was retaliation for photographing an unsafe condition on a deicer train on October 26, 2007, Hedlund admittedly did not complain to anyone in management prior to the issuance of this disciplinary action. See Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The causal connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, although Hedlund contends that his March 12, 2008 disciplinary action for recklessly throwing a metal object on March 11, 2008, was retaliation for a safety complaint he made *37 on March 7, 2008, the certified mail receipt indicates that Hedlund’s safety complaint was not mailed until March 12, 2008.

In addition to the temporal infirmities apparent on the face of Hedlund’s retaliation claims, any casual connection between his safety complaints and his disciplinary actions is further undermined by the arbitrator’s award in favor of NYCTA in Hed-lund’s grievance actions. We have held that:

[A] negative arbitration decision rendered under a CBA does not preclude a Title VII action by a discharged employee. However, a decision by an independent tribunal that is not itself subject to a claim of bias will attenuate a plaintiffs proof of the requisite causal link. Where, as here, that decision follows an evidentiary hearing and is based on .substantial evidence, the Title VII plaintiff, to survive a motion for summary judgment, must present strong evidence that the decision was wrong as a matter of fact-e.g. new evidence not before the tribunal-or that the impartiality of the proceeding was somehow compromised.

Collins v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 305 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Because Hedlund failed to identify any new evidence not before the arbitrator or any evidence bearing on the impartiality of his arbitration proceedings, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on his retaliation claims.

We have considered all of Hedlund’s remaining arguments and find them to- be without merit. Accordingly, wé AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.