SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Antonio Jenkins, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment (1) dismissing pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) his claims alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 and claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986 relating to disciplinary proceedings that occurred during his employment by the New York City Department of Education, and (2) declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state *67 law claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Upon such review, we conclude that Jenkins’s appeal is without merit substantially for the reasons articulated by the district court in its well-reasoned order. We have considered all of Jenkins’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.