SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Luis Rosario appeals from a judgment of conviction after a two-day bench trial at which he was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. 1 Rosario challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. While we review a sufficiency challenge de novo, we are obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and to uphold the conviction as long as “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original); see United States v. Mazza-Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying “same deferential standard” to review of sufficiency challenge after bench trial). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Rosario contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy because, at best, it demonstrated only drug sales. See United States v. Wexler, 522 F.3d 194, 210-11 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1998). The argument fails because the “buyer-seller” exception to conspirator liability is narrow and does not apply where a seller and buyer share a conspiratorial purpose to advance other sales. See United States v. Parker, 554 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing rationale for exception). That is this case. Trial evidence established that Rosario had long-standing, mutually beneficial relationships with a number of customers — notably Cesar Soto — who Rosario knew intended to resell the contraband he delivered to them. Rosario’s own stake in this further distribution was evident from the fact that he sometimes supplied drugs on credit, see United States v. Rojas, 617 F.3d 669, 675 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing sales on credit as suggestive of conspiratorial agreement as distinct from buyer-seller relationship); advised Soto not to cut the drugs for resale; enlisted Soto to deliver drugs to another of Rosario’s customers; and received warnings from Soto about possible law enforcement awareness of their activities. This evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Rosario was not involved in a mere buyer-seller relationship with customers such as Soto, but rather that he was engaged in a conspiratorial scheme with customers for the further distribution of drugs.

Insofar as Rosario argues that the evidence is “further insufficient” in light of *90 certain discrepancies in the government’s proof relating to a sale of contraband from his apartment to a woman who went by the alias “Eilena,” Appellant’s Br. 15 n. 9, the district court properly found that evidence of the sale to Eilena was unnecessary to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the other evidence adduced at trial.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.