*5 SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Maria Fosco appeals from the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of defendants, embodied in the court’s Memorandum and Order dated January 5, 2012, on Fosco’s claim that her employer retaliated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

‘We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2011). “Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.’ ” Donnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 691 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “Retaliation claims under Title VII are evaluated under a three-step burden-shifting analysis.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)) (internal quotations omitted). At the first step, “[t]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show that (1) she was engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of that activity; (3) the employee suffered a materially adverse action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and that adverse action.” Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 157 (2d Cir. 2012).

The district court’s grant of summary judgment depended upon its finding that Fosco had failed to present evidence of a causal connection between any protected activity in which she engaged and her reassignment to the admissions office. The court relied on the lack of temporal proximity between Fosco’s involvement in litigation and her transfer, but as Fosco notes, her argument depends not on timing but on direct evidence of statements made by her employers, in particular Queens College President James Muyskens and Dean Anthony Tamburri. Nonetheless, especially in light of the significant passage of time since the allegedly protected activity, we find that the comments, considered in context, do not constitute evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants chose to reassign Fosco as a result of that activity. Because Fosco cannot make the required showing on this element of the four-part test, her retaliation claim fails.

We have considered Fosco’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor is hereby AFFIRMED.