*18 SUMMARY ORDER

Respondent Yashmun Filipczak (“the Mother”) appeals pro se from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Victor Marrero, Judge) finding that Poland was the country of habitual residence for the Mother’s two minor children and ordering the children’s return to Poland. Petitioner Wojciech Filipczak (“the Father”) brought the case against her under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq., and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”), opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,-670,1343 U.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986). At trial, the Mother did not contest that she had wrongfully removed the children from Poland, but argued that she qualified for two exceptions to the Hague Convention’s repatriation requirement: (i) that the children would face “grave risk” to their well being in Poland, see Hague Convention, art. 13(b), and (ii) that the children were “well settled” in the United States, see Hague Convention art. 12. In a decision and order dated December 23, 2011, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Victor Marrero, Judge) rejected the Mother’s contentions and ordered that the children be returned to Poland.

The Mother argues that the decision below was flawed for a number of reasons, including that her removal of the children was not wrongful because she had been forced to leave Poland due to the expiration of her visa, that certain evidence presented to the District Court was inadmissable, that she and her children had been subject to racially motivated attacks while in Poland, and that her children have stronger ties to the United States than to Poland because they have moved less frequently while in the United States than they did while in Poland. In addition to opposing the Mother’s arguments, the Father argues that the appeal should be dismissed as moot because the children have already returned to Poland in compliance with the district court order, so that a decision in the Mother’s favor would not provide her with any relief.

A. Mootness

Our decision as to mootness is controlled by the recent ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Chafin v. Chafin, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013). In that case, the Court held that the return of a child to his or her country of habitual residence pursuant to a Hague Convention order does not moot the losing parent’s appeal from that order. Accordingly, we conclude that the appeal is not moot and reject the Father’s contention that it should be dismissed.

B. Merits

Turning to the substance of the Mother’s appeal, we review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its interpretation of the Hague Convention and ICARA de novo. See Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2001). While the Mother was represented by counsel in the District Court, she appears pro se on appeal. Thus, we construe her submissions to this Court liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994).

The Mother raises several arguments on appeal, all of which are without merit. First, she claims that her removal of the children from Poland was not wrongful because she was forced to leave Poland due to the expiration of her visa. The Mother, however, failed to raise this *19 argument before the trial court. See Verified Answer at 4-5; Memorandum of Law in Support of Verified Petition at 3-9. Because the Mother gives no justification for her failure to make this argument below, we will not consider it for the first time on appeal. See Bogle-Assegai v. Connecticut, 470 F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.”).

Second, she alleges a number of defects in the evidence presented to the District Court, including failure to authenticate emails between her mother and the Father, bias on the part of the guardian ad litem, and failure to conduct cross-examination of several witnesses. These arguments are also presented for the first time on appeal, without any explanation as to why they were not raised below. We therefore decline to consider them. See id.

Third, she contends the District Court wrongfully barred her from presenting evidence of racially motivated attacks against her and her children in Poland. The record however shows that the Mother provided at least some testimony to the District Court concerning such attacks. Oct. 3, 2011 Hearing Transcript at 16-17. To the extent that any of her evidence was excluded, the Mother makes no argument as to why such exclusion was legally incorrect.

Finally, the Mother argues that the children had stronger ties to the United States than they did to Poland, and therefore should be permitted to remain. This misconstrues Article 12. The standard under that provision does not call for determining in which location the child is relatively better settled, but rather for determining whether the child has become so settled in a new environment that repatriation would be against the child’s best interest. Blondín, 238 F.3d at 164. The Mother made no such showing.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.