SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgments of said District Court be and it hereby are AFFIRMED.

Desmel Cooper and Laurie Manning were arrested and charged with a dozen other co-defendants as part of a conspiracy to sell heroin and cocaine in Burlington, Vermont. Cooper appeals from the May 2, 2012 judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Sessions, J.) sentencing him to 108 months’ imprisonment, and four years of supervised release, following his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin and twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 846; 841(b)(1)(B). Manning appeals from the March 6, 2012 judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Sessions, J.) sentencing her to 54 months’ imprisonment, and three years of supervised release, following her guilty plea to one count conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(C). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

Cooper argues that the district court committed procedural and substantive error by failing to properly apply the parsimony clause of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This argument fails. There is no evidence the district court was unaware of the parsimony requirement. Our Court looks at whether the district court understood its obligation to impose a sentence that was no greater than necessary, and does not require the district court to use specific words in imposing sentence. United States v. Williams, 475 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 2007). It is clear from the sentencing transcript that the district court appreciated its obligations pursuant to the parsimony clause, and that the district court gave explicit consideration to the Section 3553(a) factors.

Manning argues that the district court committed error when it declined to downwardly depart based on Guidelines Section 5K2.12, which permits such a downward departure when the defendant “committed the offense because of serious coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a complete defense.” U.S.S.G. § 5K1.12. The record clearly indicates the district court understood the correct application of Section 5K1.12, and understood that it could downwardly depart, but chose not to do so because it found that Manning committed her crime “not because of duress or coercion on the part of [her husband]. It’s because she is an addict and driven by her addiction, and that seems to me to suggest that ground for departure is not appropriate.”

The record also demonstrates Manning’s sentence was proeedurally reasonable. The sentencing transcript demonstrates the district court considered the Section 3553(a) factors, and simply did not resolve them in a way favored by Manning. Finally, Manning argues the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court did not take her mental health and status as a victim of domestic violence into account. However, her sentence — at the low end of the Guidelines range — was plainly “within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 *18 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted).

We have examined the remainder of the parties’ arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgments of the district court hereby are AFFIRMED.