SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Julia Oyewo, proceeding pro se, appeals from a Memorandum and Order by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Fox, M.J.) granting Appellee Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) motion for summary judgment and dismissing her employment discrimination complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003).

As an initial matter, Oyewo has abandoned her alternative work schedule claim by raising it for the first time in opposition to DOT’S motion for summary judgment, see Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir. 2006), and by presenting minimal argument in her brief on appeal, Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998). Likewise, Oyewo waived her job duties claim by not raising arguments concerning it in her brief on appeal. Id.; LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995).

Upon review of Oyewo’s remaining claims, we conclude that her appeal is without merit substantially for the reasons articulated by the magistrate judge in his March 26, 2012 Memorandum and Order.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.