SUMMARY ORDER

Defendants-appellants Jarell Sanderson and Hassanah Delia appeal from judgments of conviction entered against them by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Kravitz, J.) following guilty pleas by both defendants. Sanderson challenges the district court’s imposition of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement, and Delia challenges the court’s restitution order. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case.

I. Sanderson

Sanderson pled guilty to two counts of Sex Trafficking of a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and (b), and one *18 count of Conspiracy to Commit Sex Trafficking of a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). He contends on appeal that the district court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), which applies if “a participant [ ] unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.” We review a legal application of the Guidelines de novo and any underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

The commentary to § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) indicates that there is a “rebuttable presumption that subsection (b)(2)(B) applies” if the participant is at least ten years older than the minor. Sanderson does not dispute that he is. Moreover, although Sand-erson is correct that factual determinations underlying a Guidelines calculation must be made “with sufficient clarity to permit meaningful appellate review,” United States v. Skys, 637 F.3d 146, 152 (2d Cir. 2011), “this obligation may be satisfied by explicitly adopting the factual findings set forth in a defendant’s presentence report.” United States v. Watkins, 667 F.3d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The district court in this case stated that it was “adopting] the factual statements in the presentence report as the Court’s own findings of fact for purposes of this sentencing.” Special App’x 51.

We have held that if a defendant is subject to the age-based presumptive application of (b)(2)(B) and has “failed to offer any evidence rebutting the presumption on this basis,” the district court is “free to make its finding of ‘undue influence,’ without further explanation, on the basis of the unrebutted presumption alone.” Watkins, 667 F.3d at 265. In addition, a “district court that adopts the factual findings of a defendant’s PSR is not required explicitly to provide any further analysis.” Id. at 266. None of the statements to which Sanderson points on appeal can be construed as evidence rebutting the presumption. As such, we find no error in the district court’s application to Sanderson of the two-level enhancement under § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B).

II. Delia

Delia’s only assertion on appeal is that the district court failed to adequately support its imposition of $25,608.80 in restitution for a victim’s future psychological and psychiatric treatment. During Delia’s sentencing, the district indicated that restitution would be a part of the sentence but did not specify an amount. After the government submitted a proposed amount, supported by a letter from a social worker who had worked extensively with the victim after the encounter at issue in this case, the district court entered an order adopting the government’s proposed figure without further explanation.

“We review an order of restitution deferentially, and we will reverse only for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Pearson, 570 F.3d 480, 486 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). Delia does not argue that the district court lacked the power to order restitution for future treatment. Instead, she points to our recognition that such orders “may be inappropriate where the amount of loss is too difficult to confirm or calculate.” Id. at 486 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). She maintains that, as in Pearson, the district court here “did not explain how it estimated the victim[’s] future expenses” and urges us to “remand the case [ ] to secure a more thorough explanation from the district court as to the basis for its restitution determination.” Id. at 487.

Because the district court adopted the government’s proposed figure in this case, *19 the major problem in Pearson — the court’s failure to explain how it reached its ultimate figure, which differed from what had been proposed — is not present. Delia’s challenge is more properly viewed as a contention that the social worker’s letter did not provide a sufficient basis in evidence for the district court to come to its conclusion.

Delia’s concerns are not frivolous, and we recognize the difficulty inherent in projecting future medical costs with certainty and the necessity of basing a restitution amount on reliable evidence. However, we find no error in the district court’s order. The government’s proposed figure was supported by the affidavit of a licensed social worker who had worked extensively with the victim, and who stated that she based her conclusions regarding future need for care upon her professional experience. The social worker’s total cost estimate was much higher than the restitution amount ultimately imposed — it was discounted (based on the social worker’s calculation) to reflect other sources of trauma in the victim’s life, and it did not account for possible inflation or increases in the cost of care. Moreover, although Delia filed objections to the government’s submission, she neither requested a hearing at which the social worker could be cross-examined nor submitted any evidence rebutting the social worker’s contentions.

Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the government’s proposed figure. See United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007) (an award will be upheld “if the district court is able to estimate, based upon facts in the record, the amount of victim’s loss with some reasonable certainty.”); cf. United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1248 (10th Cir. 2001) (remanding for a hearing where the “presentence report contained no evidence regarding the victim’s need for future counseling or the estimated cost of that counseling”).

We have considered all of appellants’ arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.