SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Prince Kayode Adekoya, a native and citizen of Nigeria, seeks review of a February 18, 2010, order of the BIA, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the September 4, 2009, order of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Alan L. Page, ordering Adekoya removed and noting the withdrawal of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against torture (“CAT”), In re Prince Kayode Adekoya, No. A097 513 560 (B.I.A. Feb. 18, 2010), aff'g No. A097 513 560 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 4, 2009), and an October 8, 2010 decision of the BIA denying a motion to reopen for lack of jurisdiction, In re Prince Kayode Adekoya, No. A097 513 560 (B.I.A. Oct. 8, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review de novo questions of law and constitutional claims. See Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 2009).

I. February 2010 BIA Decision, Docket No. 10-993(L)

In October 2010, the BIA found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the *67 IJ’s decision because Adekoya had withdrawn his asylum application and waived his right to appeal the IJ’s decision. Ade-koya challenges this determination, arguing that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to appeal and that to the extent his attorney waived this right on his behalf, it was without his consent. We have previously recognized that, “[ajsking the parties whether they accept a decision as ‘final’ is a shorthand expression commonly used by Immigration Judges ... referfing] to the language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39, which provides for finality of the Immigration Judge’s decision upon waiver of the right to appeal.” Ali v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 2008). We have further held that “[t]hose who understand the meaning of that shorthand expression, such as aliens represented by attorneys ... may effectively waive appeal in response to this simple question.” Id. Because the record indicates that Adekoya requested the withdrawal of his asylum application, and further reflects that Ade-koya’s counsel accepted the resulting order of removal as “final,” Adekoya voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to appeal. See Ali, 525 F.3d at 174; see also Hoodho v. Holder, 558 F.3d 184, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2009) (aliens are bound by concessions made by freely retained counsel). The petition in this matter is, therefore, denied.

II. October 2010 BIA Decision, Docket No. 10-4584(Con) *

Adekoya requests that we resolve the jurisdictional dispute between the IJ, who rejected his motion to reopen for lack of jurisdiction and instructed him to file it with the BIA, and the subsequent decision of the BIA denying his motion on jurisdictional grounds because the motion should have been filed with the IJ. A motion to reopen is filed with the immigration court “unless jurisdiction is vested with the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b). Because Adekoya waived his right to appeal the IJ’s decision, he, in turn, lost his right to appeal that decision to the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1). The BIA, therefore, rightly rejected Ade-koya’s motion to reopen for lack of jurisdiction because jurisdiction never vested in the BIA. However, in rejecting Adekoya’s motion on jurisdictional grounds, the BIA noted that the IJ also had rejected the motion on jurisdictional grounds. The BIA, however, failed to transfer the motion back to the IJ, explain to Adekoya where or how he should have filed his motion, or explain why neither the IJ nor the BIA had jurisdiction. Given Adeko-ya’s pro se status and the lack of clarity and inconsistency in the agency’s jurisdictional rulings, we grant this petition and remand to the BIA so it may further address the jurisdictional issue regarding the filing of the motion to reopen.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review in 10-993 is DENIED and the petition in KM585 is GRANTED, and the matter is REMANDED to the BIA for further proceedings. As we have completed our review, the pending motions for stay of removal are DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).