SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Roberto Diaz-Melendez 1 (“Diaz-Melendez”) appeals from a judgment by the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Reiss, C.J.) sentencing him principally to 78 months’ imprisonment for conspiring to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841 and conspiring to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o). In reaching this sentence, the district court departed downward from the 120-month statutory minimum applicable in this case pursuant to the Government’s motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Diaz-Melendez argues that the district court erred by refusing to grant a further downward departure on the basis of his *31 extraordinary rehabilitation. We disagree. The Pre-Sentence Report identified a Guidelines range of 78-97 months. However, because Diaz-Melendez was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum, the Guidelines sentence became 120 months. The district court had “[ljimited authority” to depart below the Guidelines range on the basis of the Government’s motion pursuant to Section 3558(e). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). “When, as here, the Guidelines sentence ends up as the statutory minimum, both the decision to depart and the maximum permissible extent of this departure below the statutory minimum may be based only on substantial assistance to the government and on no other mitigating considerations.” United States v. Richardson, 521 F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)); see also United States v. Williams, 551 F.3d 182, 186-87 (2d Cir. 2009).

The district court properly refused to depart downward on the basis of Diaz-Melendez’s post-arrest rehabilitation, which, we note, the district court deemed not to be extraordinary given that Diaz-Melendez tested positive for cocaine on one occasion while under pre-trial supervision. Likewise, the district court separately analyzed the other grounds for downward departure argued by Diaz-Melendez, including family ties, employment record, and totality of the circumstances, and found that they lacked merit based upon its consideration of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.