SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court be and hereby is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant Tyrone Maye, proceeding pro se, appeals from a September 29, 2011, Memorandum-Decision and Order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Sharpe, J.) dismissing his amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In his amended complaint, Maye asserted numerous claims against the State of New York and various law enforcement officers, administrators, and attorneys pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.

*58 Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, we conclude that the court correctly granted the motions to dismiss made by the district attorney and assistant district attorneys who prosecuted Maye. “[A]bsolute immunity protects a prosecutor from § 1983 liability for virtually all acts, regardless of motivation, associated with his function as an advocate.” Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994). “[T]he immunity attaches to [the prosecutor’s] function, not to the manner in which he performed it.” Id. (quoting Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1986)). Here, Maye alleges acts associated with the defendants’ prosecutorial role. His claims against these defendants are consequently barred by absolute immunity.

The district court also correctly dismissed Maye’s claims against his public defender. Public defenders acting in their role as advocates are not amenable to suit under § 1983, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-25, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981), and any state law legal malpractice claims are barred by New York’s three-year statute of limitations, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6).

Finally, the district court correctly concluded that Maye’s false imprisonment claims against Drug Enforcement Agency agents and certain corrections officers accrued, at the latest, at his arraignment in September 2005, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), and that these claims, first brought in October 2010, were therefore untimely. Maye’s false imprisonment claims, as well as any malicious prosecution claims that Maye has alleged, additionally fail because there was probable cause for his arrest and pre-arraignment detention. “[I]t is well-established that a law enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he received his information from some person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness.” Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, probable cause supported Maye’s arrest because a reliable confidential informant had indicated to law enforcement that Maye was selling cocaine and heroin out of the informant’s home. People v. Maye, 43 A.D.3d 556, 557, 840 N.Y.S.2d 490 (3rd Dep’t 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 12 N.Y.3d 731, 731-32, 876 N.Y.S.2d 676, 904 N.E.2d 812 (2009). A meritorious claim for false arrest or imprisonment or for malicious prosecution requires the absence of probable cause. See, e.g., Torraco v. Port Authority of N.Y., 615 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (false arrest); Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F.3d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 2004) (malicious prosecution). Consequently, Maye’s claims were properly dismissed.

We have considered all of Maye’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.