SUMMARY ORDER

Defendants M/T ORANGE SUN, Arctic Reefer Corp., 2 and Atlanship S.A. appeal from a March 2, 2012 judgment awarding plaintiffs Great Lakes Business Trust and Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (collectively, “Great Lakes”) loss of use damages in the amount of $11,736,645, 3 arising from a 2008 allision between the tanker M/T ORANGE SUN and the dredge NEW YORK (the “Dredge”), a vessel owned and operated by Great Lakes. 4 The allision, *782 for which defendants conceded responsibility, put the Dredge out of service for 194 days while it underwent repairs. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.

The parties agree that, in admiralty, plaintiffs may recover damages for “the loss of profits or of the use of a vessel pending repairs, or other detention, arising from a collision or other maritime tort,” but only when “profits have actually been, or may be reasonably supposed to have been, lost, and the amount of such profits is proven with reasonable certainty.” The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 125, 17 S.Ct. 510, 41 L.Ed. 937 (1897). When determining lost profits, district courts have a “wide range of judgment” in selecting “the standard to be applied and ... the method of applying it.” Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. United States, 287 U.S. 170, 176, 53 S.Ct. 103, 77 L.Ed. 240 (1932).

We review the “district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” Senator Linie GMBH & Co. KG v. Sunway Line, Inc., 291 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2002). “No greater scope of review is exercised by the appellate tribunals in admiralty cases than they exercise under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20, 75 S.Ct. 6, 99 L.Ed. 20 (1954).

For substantially the reasons stated by the District Court in its thorough and well-reasoned opinion, we affirm the court’s conclusion that Great Lakes proved its lost profits with the requisite “reasonable certainty.” See Great Lakes Bus. Trust v. M/T Orange Sun, 855 F.Supp.2d 131, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Plaintiffs were not (as defendants argue) required to demonstrate that the Dredge had lost a specific contract in order to recover damages, because&emdash;as the District Court found after a three-day bench trial&emdash;“there was an active market for the Dredge (both in New York and in other U.S. locations) at the time of the allision, immediately thereafter, presently!,] and into the foreseeable future.” Id. at 141. This factual finding is not clearly erroneous. In light of its finding that there was an “active market” for services provided by the Dredge, the court permissibly determined that it was reasonably certain that the Dredge would have found work, or moved on to additional work sooner, if not for the allision. No more specific finding of particular lost contracts or opportunities was necessary to sustain an award of damages for lost profits. See, e.g., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. The Esso Camden, 244 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1957); The Gylfe v. The Trujillo, 209 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1954); The James McWilliams, 42 F.2d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1930).

We also affirm the District Court’s calculation of the Dredge’s lost profits. Its analysis was based on its finding that the Dredge would have been utilized about 92% of the time that it lost while undergoing repairs. Defendants contend that this utilization rate was erroneous because it was derived from an unusually busy period in the Dredge’s history. But the District Court properly considered the state of the market in which the Dredge would have been operating if not for the allision. See The Gylfe, 209 F.2d at 389-90. The court relied on “credible testimony that demand for the Dredge’s unique capabilities was increasing!,] there was robust national and international demand [and] ... competition for the Dredge had declined.” Great *783 Lakes Bus. Trust, 855 F.Supp.2d at 154-55. The court also did not clearly err by rejecting the testimony of defendants’ expert, who proposed a lower utilization rate, since that expert’s calculation “exelude[d] certain contracts ... and also [did] not account for increased utilization rates since 2007.” Id at 155. We see no reason to disturb these findings.

We have considered defendants’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.