SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Diane Palmer appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees. *99 Palmer sued the New York State Office of Court Administration (“OCA”) and the State of New York (the “State”) for allegedly discriminating against her on the basis of her disabilities — hypoglycemia and asthma — and unlawfully retaliating against her while she was employed by Defendants as a court reporter. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine [disputes] of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In determining whether there are genuine disputes of material fact, this Court is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted).

‘We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a suit pursuant to a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (2006).

We review the district court’s denial of leave to amend de novo to the extent it rests on a legal conclusion; otherwise, we review for abuse of discretion. See Arrowood Indem. Co. v. King, 699 F.3d 735, 739 (2d Cir. 2012).

1. Palmer’s claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”) are time-barred, and the district court therefore did not err in denying Palmer leave to amend her complaint to include those claims. Equitable tolling is unavailable because no “extraordinary circumstances prevented [Palmer] from timely performing a required act.” Walker v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001), foreclosed Palmer’s claim under Title I of the ADA; however, Garrett did not affect Palmer’s ability to bring claims under Title II or the Rehabilitation Act. Cf. Rochester Gas & Elec. V. GPU, Inc., No. 00-CV-6369, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96167, at *4-5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2006) (“I agree with RG & E that the Consolidated Edison decision clearly and unequivocally provides plaintiff with what this Court and others thought was a previously unavailable theory of recovery .... ” (emphasis added)). Palmer should have brought all of her claims at the outset.

2. Palmer’s claim for prospective injunctive relief under Title I of the ADA fails because she neglected to name a state official acting in his or her official capacity as a defendant. See Santiago v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 32 (2d Cir. 1991). Palmer was required to do so in order to attempt to avail herself of the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). See id. Since Palmer never asked the district court for leave to amend her Second Amended Complaint in order to add a state official ■ as a defendant (and never identified the person she would sue), the-district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to do so.

3. Palmer’s claim against the State under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 fails because Palmer never alleged discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Her earlier state administrative complaints are therefore not “protected activities],” and she may not allege retaliation under Title VII *100 in this case. See Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir. 1996) (“To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) the employee was engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of that activity; (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”).

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Palmer’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.