SUMMARY ORDER

Mohamed A. Hafez appeals from an order granting summary judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1988 complaint against city officials for allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory enforcement of city code provisions. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

This Court reviews orders granting summary judgment de novo and focuses on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). All ambiguities and inferences are resolved in favor of the nonmovant; the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts revealed in materials such as affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Assoc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995)). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law confirms that summary judgment was properly granted. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned order, see Hafez v. City of Schenectady, 894 F.Supp.2d 207 (N.D.N.Y. 2012), subject to several points that merit further discussion.

There is no indication that Hafez received notice of the requirements of a response to the summary judgment motion or of the consequences of failing to oppose. “ ‘The failure of a district court to apprise pro se litigants of the consequences of failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment is ordinarily grounds for reversal.’ ” Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). However, Vital does not assert an “unyielding rule,” and where “it is reasonably apparent that the litigant understood the nature of the adversary’s summary judgment motion and the consequences of not properly opposing it,” reversal is not required. Sawyer v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 180 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1999). It is reasonably apparent that Hafez understood the nature and consequences of summary judgment, especially given the extensive documentation he submitted along with his response to the motion and his contention that issues of material fact properly resolved by a jury should prevent entry of summary judgment against him. Therefore, we do not vacate on Vital grounds.

Even assuming arguendo that the city tax department’s knowledge of Appellant’s grievances can be imputed to the defendants as general corporate knowledge of the city and all of its officers (as Hafez argues), there are no non-conclusory allegations indicating that city officials enforced rental code provisions against Hafez because of these grievances, and Hafez *744 apparently admits that he was in violation. Similarly, Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 555 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing requirement of a causal connection in retaliation actions), from the employment discrimination context, provides no basis for vacating the district court’s order and judgment, especially in the absence of credible evidence that the enforcement of the rental code against Appellant was based on anything other than his violations. Therefore, Appellant’s contentions on appeal are unavailing, and the district court’s grant of summary judgment was appropriate.

We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.