SUMMARY ORDER

Armando Colon appeals pro se from a judgment entered after a jury verdict in favor of defendants on his Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Colon also appeals from an award of partial summary judgment in favor of defendants on his due process challenge to his continued placement in involuntary protective custody (“IPC”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

1. Due Process

We review an award of summary judgment de novo and will affirm only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, reveals no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012).

After an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the award of partial summary judgment in favor of defendants on Colon’s due process claim for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its well-reasoned and thorough decision and order. See Colon v. Goord, No. 9:05-cv-129, 2008 WL 783364 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2008).

2. Excessive Force

In challenging the judgment after trial on his excessive force claim, Colon submits that he was prejudiced by appearing in physical restraints before the jury. A trial court has the discretion to order an inmate in a civil case to wear physical restraints if the court finds that necessary to maintain safety or security, the restraints themselves are no greater than necessary, and steps are taken to minimize prejudice from the presence of restraints. See Hameed v. Mann, 57 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 1995). Where, as here, the record shows that the district court followed the proper procedures in reaching its decision, we review its restraint decision only for abuse of discretion. See id. We find no such abuse here because the record, which indicates Colon’s record for violent crime and history of escapes, supports the district court’s restraint decision. Colon does not assert that the restraining shackles or handcuffs were ever visible to the jury, and he acknowledges that he testified without handcuffs.

*12 Insofar as Colon asserts that the district court should have ordered that corrections officers remove their bulletproof vests in the courtroom, no such request was made at trial and, thus, the issue is unpreserved for appellate review. See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 130 (2d Cir. 2012). To the extent Colon faults his pro bono counsel for failing to raise an objection either to the officers’ vests or to his own restraints, that argument cannot secure relief from judgment. See generally Leftridge v. Conn. State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2011) (“A party has no constitutionally guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel in a civil case.”). In any event, Colon’s attorney did object to his client’s restraints at the start of trial, and later acknowledged that the shackles were not visible to the jury.

We have considered Colon’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.