SUMMARY ORDER

Nikita Williams seeks review of the district court’s March 19, 2012 judgment, granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees on her claim of retaliation in response to her exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2011). “Summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Schwapp v. *19 Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the “nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,” summary judgment must be granted. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In order to make out a claim based on retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that the “speech was protected by the First Amendment.” Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 2009). “To- determine whether or not a plaintiffs speech is protected, a court must begin by asking ‘whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.’ If the court determines that the plaintiff either did not speak as a citizen or did not speak on a matter of public concern, ‘the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.’ ” Id. at 170 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006)). If speech is made “pursuant to” an employee’s job duties, the employee is not speaking as a citizen, and the speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The Supreme Court has “defined speech made ‘pursuant to’ a public employee’s job duties as ‘speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.’ ” Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Williams, this Court concludes that the speech for which Williams claims she was retaliated against “owe[d] its existence” to her payroll responsibilities as the school clerk. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Regardless of her internal motivations, Williams’s speech was clearly “undertaken in the course of performing” her work completing the payroll for the school. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 203 (citation omitted). No reasonable jury could conclude that Williams was speaking as a citizen and not as an employee pursuant to her job duties. Therefore, Williams “has no First Amendment cause of action based on ... her employer’s reaction to the speech.” Sousa, 578 F.3d at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have considered Williams’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.