SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Cindy Tamara Bong, a native and citizen of Indonesia, seeks review of an April 13, 2012, order of the BIA affirming the May 10, 2010, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied Bong’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Cindy Tamara Bong, No. A098 927 420 (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2012), affg No. A098 927 420 (Immig.Ct.N.Y.C. May 10, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

Initially, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s pretermission of Bong’s asylum application as untimely because her assertion that there were changed conditions in Indonesia materially affecting her eligibility for asylum “merely quarrels over the correctness of the [agency’s] factual findings or justification for the discretionary choices” and does not raise a reviewable constitutional claim or a question of law. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006); see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3), 1252(a)(2)(D). We likewise lack jurisdiction to review Bong’s unexhausted claim for CAT relief. Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2006).

Bong challenges the agency’s denial of withholding of removal, contending that a 2002 church bombing and multiple thefts established past persecution on account of her Chinese ethnicity and Christian faith. Based on the record before it, the agency could properly determine that the deprivation of Bong’s personal property was insufficiently severe to constitute persecution. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2006); Gui Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir. 2006). It could also rely on Bong’s inability to demonstrate that the Indonesian government was unable or unwilling to control the perpetrator of the church bombing. See Aliyev v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2008); Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2006); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985). Bong does not challenge, and we therefore do not consider, the BIA’s determination that she failed to establish a clear probability of future persecution by demonstrating that her fear of returning to Indonesia was objectively reasonable. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).