SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Frankie Cortes, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment, dismissing his employment discrimination action, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1988, and 1985; the First and Fourteenth Amendments; New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; and New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and specification of issues for review.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). “In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Upon review, we conclude that Cortes’s appeal is without merit substantially for the reasons articulated by the district court in its well-reasoned memorandum opinion. Cortes v. City of New York, No. 08-cv-4805(LTS)(RLE), 2012 WL 1026136 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012). We have considered all of Cortes’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.