SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Luis Salvador, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment, entered February 19, 2013, dismissing his complaint. The district court sua sponte dismissed the action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) (B) (ii).

While incarcerated at the George Motchan Detention Center, Salvador brought this action pro se seeking to initiate a criminal prosecution of defendants. Salvador filed his complaint as an affidavit purportedly to avoid criminal liability for misprision of felony under 18 U.S.C. § 4. In addition, Salvador sought to prosecute defendants for crimes pursuant to several provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code, among other federal statutes. Salvador instructed the district court that his complaint should be construed only as a “Criminal Complaint.” Compl. Attach, at 3. The complaint sought $72,500,000 in “damages,” his release from incarceration, and dismissal of the criminal charges filed against him in state court. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and that would “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal' conclusions.” Id. Courts should read pro se complaints liberally with “special solicitude” and interpret them to raise “the strongest [claims] they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we have held that district courts should not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting leave to amend, leave is not necessary when it would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).

Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly dismissed Salvador’s action. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its February 19, 2013 order of dismissal.

We have considered Salvador’s remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.