SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant David Robinson, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the imposition of a special condition of supervised release limiting his ability to possess or acquire a driver’s license and to operate a vehicle. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“A case becomes moot when it no longer satisfies the ‘case-or-eontroversy’ requirement of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.” United States v. Mercurris, 192 F.3d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1999). “In order to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement, a party must, at all stages of the litigation, have an actual injury which is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id.; see also British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., 354 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A] case is moot when ... the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969))).

Robinson’s term of supervised release expired in October 2013, while his appeal was pending. Because Robinson seeks only injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the conditions imposed on his now-terminated term of supervised release, his action is moot. See Mercurris, 192 F.3d at 293-94 (dismissing as moot an appeal of an aggravated felony sentencing enhancement after the defendant completed his prison term); see also Sudler v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 159, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment moot after they had been released from prison).

We have considered Robinson’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal as moot.