SUMMARY ORDER

Each of these petitions challenges a decision of the BIA that: (1) affirmed a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying a motion to reopen; (2) denied a motion to reopen in the first instance; or (3) denied a motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to reopen. The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2001); Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 2006).

Petitioners, all natives and citizens of China, filed motions to reopen based on claims that they fear persecution because they have had one or more children in violation of China’s population control program. For largely the same reasons as this Court set forth in Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d 138, we find no error in the agency’s determinations that the petitioners failed to demonstrate either (a) materially changed country conditions that would ex *91 cuse the untimely or number-barred filing of their motions, or (b) their prima facie eligibility for relief. See id. at 158-72.

In John Jin Chen v. Holder, 10-4185 (1), and Dian Shan Jiang v. Holder, 12-1808 (8), we find no error in the BIA’s conclusions that petitioners failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions with regard to China’s treatment of their religious groups or establish their prima facie eligibility for relief on account of their religious practices. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169-72; see also Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007). In Ji Shun Zheng v. Holder, No. 11-4858 (6), and Yu Biao Weng v. Holder, No. 12-706 (7), the BIA did not err in finding that petitioners failed to demonstrate their prima facie eligibility for relief based on their religious practices because the evidence they submitted did not demonstrate that Chinese authorities are aware of, or likely to become aware of, their practices. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 168.

Finally, in Qi Chen v. Holder, 10-4983 (2), Dian Shan Jiang v. Holder, 12-1808 (8), and Yoang-Qing Wong v. Holder, 12-2021 (9), the BIA did not err in declining to credit the petitioners’ unauthenticated, individualized evidence in light of the agency’s underlying adverse credibility determinations. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2007).

For the foregoing reasons, these petitions for review are DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in these petitions is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in these petitions is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in these petitions is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).