SUMMARY ORDER

Jose De Jesus Ezquivel, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of an October 2, 2012, decision of the BIA, affirming the May 17, 2011, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Brigitte Laforest denying his motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to reopen and rescind. In re Jose De Jesus Ezquivel, No. A075 814 820 (B.I.A. Oct. 2, 2012), aff'g No. A075 814 820 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 17, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Because Ezquivel petitions for review of the denial of a motion to reconsider, but not from the underlying decision for which reconsideration was sought, we have reviewed only the denial of his motion to reconsider. See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2001). Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008). We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 2006).

Here, Ezquivel argues that the agency abused its discretion in affirming the IJ’s underlying denial of his motion to rescind his in absentia removal order. He contends that he demonstrated that the time limitation for filing his motion should have been equitably tolled based on his ineffec *61 tive assistance of counsel claim. It is undisputed that Ezquivel’s 2011 motion to rescind was untimely as it was filed more than 180 days after the IJ’s 2007 in absen-tia removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). Ezquivel does not argue that he never received notice of his removal hearing, nor that he was in custody at the time of the proceeding. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). Thus, an IJ could have reopened Ezquivel’s case only if the court tolled the time that elapsed from the date of his removal order to the date of Ezquivel’s motion to reopen.

In order to warrant equitable tolling, even assuming that prior counsel was ineffective, an alien is required to demonstrate “due diligence” in pursuing his claim during “both the period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or should have been discovered and the period from that point until the motion to reopen is filed.” Rashid v. Mukasey, 583 F.8d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2006). The agency did not err in finding that Ezquivel failed to demonstrate due diligence because the record indicates that, although he knew of the bases for his ineffective assistance claim by at least 2007, he did not take any action in his removal proceedings until filing his motion in 2011. See Jian Hua Wang v. BIA, 508 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir. 2007); Cekic, 435 F.3d at 171. Accordingly, because the IJ did not abuse her discretion in denying Ezquivel’s motion to rescind as untimely, the agency did not err in declining to reconsider that decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b) (4) (ii).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.