*23 SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Besim Selmani, a native of the former Yugoslavia and citizen of Serbia, seeks review of the April 19, 2012, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. See In re Besim Selmani, No. A088 377 943 (B.I.A. Apr. 19, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

The BIA’s denial of Selmani’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233-34 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Selmani’s November 2011 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued more than a year earlier. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the time limitation does not apply if the motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Sel-mani failed to demonstrate materially changed conditions in Kosovo, see Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).

While the evidence Selmani submitted with his motion to reopen details the trial of an individual who allegedly assassinated members of the Democratic League of Ko-sovo (“LDK”), a political organization in which Selmani had been active, because those assassinations occurred between 1999 and 2003, they do not indicate any change in conditions since the time of his hearing. See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007). Moreover, the prosecution of the individual alleged to be responsible for those killings does not indicate a deterioration of conditions for members of the LDK in Kosovo. Accordingly, we identify no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s determination that the evidence Sel-mani submitted did not establish either a material change in country conditions in Kosovo or his prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d at 169.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.