SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Clark Adams appeals from the final judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Fitzsimmons, M.J.), dismissing his claims of race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”) against Yale New Haven Hospital (“Hospital”). The district court dismissed some of the plaintiffs sex discrimination claims, and all of his race discrimination claims, by granting a directed verdict to the defendant at the close of the plaintiffs evidence. Following the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the remaining sex discrimination claims, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) in favor of the defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) but ordered a new trial as to those claims pursuant to Rule 50(b)(2). The district court then permitted the defendant to move for summary judgment on those sex discrimination claims and ultimately granted the defendant’s motion.

The district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In making this determination, we “resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. *73 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

A trial court may set aside a jury’s verdict pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) only where “there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise or conjecture, or there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded men could not arrive at a verdict against him.” Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court’s ruling on a motion for JMOL is also reviewed de novo. Ehrlich v. Town of Glastonbury, 348 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2003). “A directed verdict is granted only when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable persons could have reached.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Discrimination Claims. Adams, an African-American man, was a Physician Associate (“PA”) in the Hospital’s Department of Surgery. Two women, Rita Rien-zo and Heather Orosco, were the other PAs in the department. In a reorganization triggered by an accreditor’s adverse finding, all three were notified that the Hospital planned to hire twelve new PAs and that, thereafter, all PAs would have to be periodically on-call. Adams decided to leave the Surgery Department rather than accept on-call responsibilities and transferred to the Department of Medicine.

Six weeks later, the Hospital announced the creation of an administrative position, Lead PA, to deal with the staff increase. No one applied for the position, which included on-call responsibilities. Shortly thereafter, Orosco quit. Rienzo, who then became the only experienced PA in the Surgery Department, negotiated to accept the Lead PA position on terms that allowed her to avoid taking call.

Adams claims that the Hospital discriminated against him in (1) forcing him out of the Surgery Department while allowing Rienzo and Orosco to avoid taking call; and (2) declining to offer him the Lead PA position without on-call responsibilities. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VII, “a claimant must show that: 1) he belonged to a protected class; 2) he was qualified for the position; 3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Terry, 336 F.3d at 138. The same analysis applies to the CFEPA claims. Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 556 (2d Cir. 2010).

The circumstances surrounding Adams’ transfer to the Department of Medicine and Rienzo’s acceptance of the Lead PA position do not give rise to an inference of discrimination. It is undisputed that Oros-co worked in the transplant service, which had different needs from the rest of the Department of Surgery, and that Orosco’s supervisor did not want her to take call. Once Adams transferred and Orosco quit, Rienzo, as the only experienced PA left, was the only candidate for the Lead PA position. There is nothing here to raise an eyebrow. 1

*74 Furthermore, Adams was not “qualified” for the position of Lead PA once he left the Department of Surgery. It is the Hospital’s undisputed policy to offer a new position in a department to employees within that department first, before accepting other applications. Because Rien-zo accepted the Lead PA position, Adams was not entitled to an opportunity to apply-

2. Retaliation Claims. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of Title VII, an employee must show “(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2001). The same analysis applies to the CFEPA claims. Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 556.

While Adams did complain to his supervisors about the new on-call requirement, he has not demonstrated a causal connection between those complaints and an adverse employment action. His protected activity — i.e. his complaints — did not precipitate a forced transfer. To the contrary, Adams voluntarily chose to transfer rather than accept on-call duties.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Adams’ other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.