SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant John Price, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the district court dismissing his claim that Appellees failed to accommodate his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

*120 We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination may take the form of failing to provide “reasonable accommodations to ... an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2008). To establish a prima facie case for a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he or she “is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA.” Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2004).

A person has a disability if he or she (a) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities; (b) has a record of such an impairment; or (c) is regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Appellant contends that the district court erred in finding that, although he suffered an impairment that impacted his ability to work and walk, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it “substantially limited” those activities. Prior to the enactment of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3353 (“ADAAA”), the Supreme Court made clear that, in determining whether an individual’s impairment “substantially” limited a major life activity, the term “substantial” “need[s] to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). It explained that “ ‘[substantially’ in the phrase ‘substantially limits’ suggests ‘considerable’ or ‘to a large degree’ ” and therefore “clearly precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities.” Id. at 196-97, 122 S.Ct. 681. In passing the ADAAA, Congress amended the ADA in part because it had concluded that Toyota Motor “interpreted the term ‘substantially limits’ to require a greater degree of limitation than was intended by Congress,” and “created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA.” Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(a)(7) & (b)(5). The amendments became effective January 1, 2009, see id. § 8, and have not been applied retroactively by this Court, see Wega v. Ctr. for Disability Rights Inc., 395 Fed.Appx. 782, 784 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323 (2006) (noting “a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the ADAAA’s definition of *121 “substantially limits” applies only to claims accruing after January 1, 2009.

A claim accrues once “the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying Cornwell to ADA claims). Appellant alleges that the Appel-lees declined his request for a reasonable accommodation in 2008. Accordingly, his claim accrued prior to the effective date of the ADAAA.

Because the ADAAA was not retroactively applicable, the Toyota Motor standard of “substantially limits” applies to Appellant’s claims, and the district court did not err in relying on Toyota Motor for its interpretation of the term. Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth by the district court. We have considered all of Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Our decision today does not foreclose Price from seeking accommodations for his disability in the future, nor do we express any opinion on whether such accommodations would be required under the ADAAA. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.