SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Osaretin Ighile, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees with respect to his claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). We are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmovant; the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts revealed in materials such as affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, Inc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995)). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

We review a district court’s decision to deny equitable tolling for abuse of discretion. See Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 2003). We also review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision regarding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 726-27 (2d Cir. 2013).

Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly granted summary judgment. We affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its thorough September 11, 2012 decision. In particular, we note that even if we considered the circumstances that conspired to prevent Ighile from receiving his right to sue letter until October 27, 2007 extreme enough to warrant equitable tolling, Ighile still would have been required to file this action on or before January 25, 2008, which he failed to do.

We have considered all of Ighile’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.