SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioners Xin Neng Zhang, Chun Yin Pat, Chung Yat Cheung, and Wai Ho Zhang, natives and citizens of China, seek review of a November 21, 2012, decision of the BIA denying their motion to reopen. In re Xin Neng Zhang, et al, No. A079 316 243/244/245/246 (B.I.A. Nov. 21, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)). We review the BIA’s factual findings regarding country conditions under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).

*110 The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhang’s motion to reopen as untimely and number barred as it was his second motion and was filed more than six years after his final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1008.2(c)(2). Although there are no time or numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Zhang has not established any error in the BIA’s conclusion that there was no material change in country conditions here.

First, Zhang’s apparent assistance to the United States government is a change in personal circumstances that does not excuse the time and number limitations. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2005); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Ali v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that exercise of “prosecutorial discretion” was not subject to judicial review, absent a constitutional claim or question of law); Young Dong Kim v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1181 (7th Cir. 2013). Second, as the BIA reasonably determined, Zhang failed to establish a material change in country conditions, since the time of his hearing. Indeed, State Department reports in the record for 2000 (submitted with Zhang’s original application) and 2010 (submitted with his motion to reopen) showed that country conditions had not materially changed. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007)(“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”); see also Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (considering whether evidence in support of reopening demonstrated a change since the hearing below).

Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhang’s motion to reopen as untimely and number barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (c). Because the BIA’s denial as untimely and number barred is dispositive, we do not reach Zhang’s arguments regarding his prima facie eligibility for relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.