SUMMARY ORDER

Feng Yu Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 28, 2012, decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Feng Yu Chen, No. A078 125 624 (B.I.A. Aug. 28, 2012). We assume the parties” familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)). When the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).

As an initial matter, we need not review the BIA’s denial of Chen’s motion to reopen insofar as it was based on her claimed fear of persecution under China’s family planning policy because she has not challenged the BIA’s decision to that extent. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2005). Regardless, liberally construing her brief as raising such an argument, see Marmolejo v. United States, 196 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1999), the BIA did not abuse its discretion in this regard because Chen did not submit any new material evidence as required in a motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

The BIA did not err in alternatively denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. An alien may file only one motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Chen’s motion was indisputably untimely and number-barred because it was filed more than nine years after the agency’s final order of removal and it was her second such motion, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)((A), C) (i), there are no time or numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii).

Contrary to Chen’s contention, her conversion to Christianity constituted a change in her personal circumstances rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the applicable limitations. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008). Moreover, the BIA reasonably found that Chen’s evidence did not demonstrate a material change in country conditions because that evidence did not indicate that conditions had worsened for individuals similarly situated to Chen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169. *6 Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).

Finally, because Chen failed to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals face persecution on account of their religion, the BIA did not err in concluding that she failed to demonstrate her prima facie eligibility for relief, which also provided an independent basis for denying her motion to reopen. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104, 108 S.Ct. 904.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.