*14 SUMMARY ORDER

Steven MeAuley appeals a judgment of conviction (sentencing him chiefly to 63 months’ imprisonment) for possession of a firearm by a felon. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

McAuley’s only challenge is premised on his lawyer’s failure to move to suppress certain of his post-arrest statements on the ground that they were involuntary. MeAuley told the federal agents that he had stolen the gun he was charged with possessing. On that basis, the district court imposed a two-level Guidelines enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 (b)(4)(A) (Nov. 1, 2012) (“If any firearm ... was stolen, increase by 2 levels.”). MeAuley argues that, because the statements may have resulted from McAuley’s mental illness and drug use, his lawyer’s failure to file a suppression motion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

“When a criminal defendant on direct appeal asserts trial counsel’s ineffective assistance to the defendant, as the defendant does here, we may (1) decline to hear the claim, permitting the appellant to raise the issue as part of a subsequent 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion; (2) remand the claim to the district court for necessary fact-finding; or (3) decide the claim on the record before us.” United States v. Doe, 365 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). However, this Court has a “baseline aversion to resolving ineffectiveness claims on direct review,” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 161 (2d Cir. 1998), and the Supreme Court has explained that “in most cases[,] a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance,” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); see also id. at 505, 123 S.Ct. 1690 (“[Ijneffeetive-assistance claims ordinarily will be litigated in the first instance in the district court, the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation during an entire trial.”).

Resolving ineffectiveness on direct appeal may sometimes be appropriate “when the factual record is fully developed and resolution of the Sixth Amendment claim on direct appeal is ‘beyond any doubt’ or ‘in the interest of justice.’ ” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 468 (2d Cir. 2004). The record before us, however, is mostly silent as to the history of McAuley’s mental illness, his lawyer’s understanding of that illness, and McAuley’s demeanor and capacity during the post-arrest interview with federal agents. It would therefore be inappropriate to consider McAuley’s ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.

We have also sometimes remanded ineffective assistance claims to the district court for necessary fact-finding. In Doe, however, we declined to remand a similar claim because “a collateral proceeding under section 2255 provides the defendant with an ample remedy for any ineffectiveness claim.” 365 F.3d at 154. As in Doe, “judicial economy is served by requiring the district court to await the defendant’s collateral section 2255 motion before addressing his ineffectiveness claim. The court will then be able to decide all of the defendant’s collateral claims in one proceeding rather than deciding his ineffectiveness claim now, on remand, and his other collateral claims, should any arise, later, when considering a section 2255 motion.” 1 Id. “Because we find that there *15 are no factors here favoring a remand, and because judicial economy is served by requiring the district court to await the defendant’s collateral section 2255 motion,” United States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2004), we dismiss McAule/s ineffective assistance claim without prejudice to his right to pursue it in a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 before the district court.

The judgment of the district court is hereby affirmed.