SUMMARY ORDER

Mario Thomas appeals from an award of summary judgment dismissing his claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City of New York and arresting Detective Jesus Rodriguez. Thomas contends that the district court erred in finding that defendants had probable cause to arrest and prosecute him for the August 14, 2009 shooting of Jason Price. We review an award of summary judgment de novo, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmov-ant, and we will affirm only if the record reveals no genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Upon an independent review of the record, we agree with the district court that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to the existence of probable cause for Thomas’s arrest. “[Pjrobable cause to arrest exists when police officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard is a “fluid” one, which does not demand “hard certainties” but only facts sufficient to establish the sort of “fair probability” on which “reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see Florida v. Harris, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013) (observing that probable cause is “practical,” “commonsensical,” “all-things-eonsidered” standard). Contrary to Thomas’s assertion, the basis for his arrest was not solely his proximity to the shooting. Rather, the facts available to Rodriguez at the time of the arrest included (1) evidence that Price was shot at close range; (2) Price’s photo *60 array identification of Thomas as the individual who walked by him on an otherwise empty street moments before he was shot; and (3) Price’s statement that, after he was shot, he turned and saw Thomas standing on the sidewalk in the direction of the continued gunfire. See Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is well-established that a law enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he received his information from some person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

That the wounded Price did not see whether Thomas was holding a gun does not raise a material issue of fact respecting probable cause because “probable cause does not demand that an officer’s good-faith belief that a suspect has committed or is committing a crime be ‘correct or more likely true than false.’ ” Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 390 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983)). Further, although Thomas challenges Rodriguez’s decision not to engage in further investigation, Rodriguez was “not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2002); see Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Although a better procedure may have been for the officers to investigate plaintiffs version of events more completely, the arresting officer does not have to prove plaintiffs version wrong before arresting him.”). Thus, even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Thomas, we conclude that the district court properly awarded summary judgment in favor of defendants on Thomas’s § 1983 false arrest claim. See Jen kins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing probable cause as complete defense to claims for false arrest and imprisonment).

Thomas’s malicious prosecution claim fares no better. While the probable cause inquiries for false arrest and malicious prosecution are distinct, where, as here, probable cause to arrest existed and the plaintiff concedes that defendants did not learn of any intervening facts between arrest and initiation of prosecution, claims of malicious prosecution cannot survive. See Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing probable cause as a complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution); see also Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In order for probable cause to dissipate [between arrest and prosecution], the groundless nature of the charges must be made apparent by the discovery of some intervening fact.”).

Finally, because Thomas has not alleged a valid underlying constitutional deprivation, his claim against New York City pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), must also fail. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986).

We have considered all of Thomas’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.