SUMMARY ORDER

Ping Guo, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a September 20, 2012 decision of the BIA affirming the July 13, 2011 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ping Guo, No. A200 930 255 (B.I.A. Sept. 20, 2012), aff'g No. 200 930 255 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 13, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified and supplemented by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

I. Asylum

We dismiss the petition to the extent Guo challenges the pretermission of her asylum application as untimely. Title 8, Section 1158(a)(3) of the United States Code provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to review the agency’s finding under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) that an asylum application was untimely. Although we retain jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of Guo’s asylum application because Guo challenges only the IJ’s factual findings as to the credibility of her testimony regarding the timing of her arrival in the United States.

II. Adverse Credibility Determination

To the extent Guo challenges the agency’s denial of withholding of removal and *611 CAT relief on credibility grounds, we deny the petition. For applications such as Guo’s, which are governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[cjonsid-ering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on an applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of her account, and inconsistencies in her statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1281(b)(3)(C); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). We “defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

The agency reasonably based its adverse credibility determination on Guo’s demeanor and the internal inconsistencies in her testimony regarding the length of her trip from China to the United States, whether she was interviewed by an asylum officer, the number of security guards that allegedly beat her, and whether she was interrogated. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (noting that, post-REAL ID Act, “an IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible” (emphasis in original)).

Contrary to Guo’s argument that the discrepancies relied on by the agency were minor and therefore insufficient, the inconsistencies regarding the beating and interrogation relate to the sole basis of Guo’s claim that she was persecuted in China for her Christian activities, and alone could constitute substantial evidence in support of the adverse credibility determination. See Xian Tuan Ye v. DHS, 446 F.3d 289, 295-96 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Moreover, the BIA reasonably declined to credit Guo’s explanation that stress, confusion, the passage of time, and lack of education caused the inconsistencies. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (the agency need not credit an applicant’s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so).

Given the inconsistencies and the demeanor finding, the totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because the strength of the only evidence of a threat to Guo’s life or freedom depended upon her credibility, the adverse credibility determination in this case necessarily precludes Guo’s success on her claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief and the agency did not err in failing to provide a separate CAT analysis. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2005). We lack jurisdiction to consider Guo’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel as they were not raised before the BIA. See Garcia-Martinez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 511, 513-14 (2d Cir. 2006); Arango-Aradondo v. INS, 13 F.3d 610, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1994).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED in part, and DENIED in part.