SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Marilynn Patterson Grant, pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the New York State Human Rights Law, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. We assume familiarity with the facts and underlying proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). We are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the [non-movant] .... The inferences to be drawn from the underlying affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant].” Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party....” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law confirms that the district court properly granted summary judgment. We affirm for substan *61 tially the same reasons stated by the district court in its order of June 18, 2013.

We have considered Grant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.