*52 SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on January 31, 2012, is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Sheila Wolk appeals pro se from an award of summary judgment in favor of defendant Photobucket.com, Inc. (“Photobucket”) on Wolk’s claims of copyright infringement. Specifically, Wolk challenges the district court’s determination that Photobucket is entitled to the safe harbor protection of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review an award of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate only “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); accord Donnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 691 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2012).

Upon such review, we conclude, substantially for the reasons stated by the district court in its published opinion, see Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F.Supp.2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), that summary judgment was properly awarded. Insofar as Wolk urges otherwise by arguing that Photobucket should have done more to police its website for infringing material, her assessment fails in light of Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., where this court explained that § 512(c)’s safe harbor applies to a service provider’s otherwise infringing material caused “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” so long as the service provider, among other things, (1) properly removes infringing activity upon gaining subjective knowledge of infringement or of “facts that would have made the specific infringement objectively obvious to a reasonable person,” (2) bans repeat offenders, and (3) does not have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity to which a “financial benefit” is “directly attributable.” 676 F.3d at 30-41 (internal quotation marks omitted). This case falls within these parameters. We have considered Wolk’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are moot, 1 forfeited, 2 or without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.