SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Jehan Zeb Mir, a physician whose New York medical license was revoked, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s orders filed August 8, 2012 dismissing his claims challenging, inter alia, the constitutionality of New York Public Health Law § 230(10)(p) (“Section 230”), and filed December 4, 2012 denying Mir’s motion for reconsideration. 2 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court decision dismissing a complaint pursuant to *50 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). We also review de novo “the essentially legal determination of whether the requirements for abstention have been met.” Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Further, we review a district court’s denial of reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 642 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2011). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision: (1) rests on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding; or (2) cannot be found within the range of permissible decisions. Id. “[Reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Reconsideration should not be granted where “the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Id.

We affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned orders. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013), however, we revisit the issue of abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).

In determining that Younger abstention precluded consideration of all but one of Mir’s federal claims, the district court applied the three-part test derived from Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). While this appeal was pending, however, the Supreme Court rejected this three-part test in favor of a categorical approach. See Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 591-94. It clarified that Younger abstention is triggered by only three categories of state court proceedings: (1) “state criminal prosecutions”; (2) “civil enforcement proceedings”; and (3) civil proceedings that “implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Id. at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted). Prior to Sprint, our jurisprudence on Younger abstention focused on the substance of the claims involved in the state and federal proceedings by asking whether they implicated an important state interest. See Diamond “D” Constr., 282 F.3d at 198. By contrast, under the categorical approach outlined by Sprint, federal abstention requires a criminal proceeding, a civil enforcement proceeding, or a determination that a state court’s ability to perform its judicial function would be otherwise impeded. See Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 588. In light of Sprint, the district court’s analysis is no longer applicable. Nevertheless, remand is not necessary because abstention is still appropriate here under the Sprint framework.

As Section 230 outlines proceedings for revoking a physician’s medical license, it fits within Sprint’s second category— civil enforcement proceedings. The Sprint Court defined this category with reference *51 to two cases: Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 433-34, 102 S.Ct. 2515, a federal challenge to state disbarment proceedings; and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 598, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975), a federal challenge to a state’s civil suit to enforce its obscenity laws. See Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 592. The Sprint Court explained that enforcement actions within this second category resemble criminal prosecutions in “important respects”: they “characteristically ... sanction the federal plaintiff ... for some wrongful act”; they are “routinely” initiated by a state actor; and they are “commonly” preceded by investigations that culminate in the “filing of a formal complaint or charges.” Id. New York’s referral proceedings are initiated by a state actor, are preceded by investigations that culminate in formal charges, and sanction the physician for some wrongful act. See generally N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230 (providing procedures for revocations of medical licenses). For Younger purposes, this type of proceeding resembles a criminal prosecution “in important respects.” Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 592. Moreover, Sprint reaffirmed the court’s adherence to abstention in disciplinary proceedings involving professional licenses. Id. Therefore, we conclude that abstention was warranted in this case.

We have considered Mir’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and order denying reconsideration.