SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner-Appellant Gigi Jordan has been detained since February 5, 2010, awaiting her trial in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, on charges of second-degree murder for killing her eight-year-old son. This appeal is from a final order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed December 2, 2013, denying Jordan’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On December 11, 2013, the district court issued a certificate of appealability as to three issues: First, “[w]hether the [district court’s] application of the abstention doctrine was inapposite to the issue of the petitioner’s state detention violating her federal due process rights,” second, “[w]hether the inability of existing state remedies to provide swift review of petitioner’s due process claim renders state remedies futile and inadequate and nullifies exhaustion as a bar to federal review on the merits,” and third, “[wjhether petitioner’s detention in excess of 44 months violates her federal due process rights.” Order, Dec. 11, 2013, at 1-2.

As an initial matter, we note that after the district court issued the certificate of appealability, the New York Court of Ap *44 peals denied Jordan’s motion for leave to appeal the denial of habeas corpus relief. People ex rel. Kuby v. Agro, 22 N.Y.3d 862, 982 N.Y.S.2d 443, 5 N.E.3d 591 (2014). Accordingly, we do not address the second question. Nor do we reach the third question. Instead, we affirm, without prejudice, the district court’s denial of the writ on the grounds that abstention pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), is appropriate at this time.

“Younger generally requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.” Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002). The doctrine of federal abstention “is grounded in principles of comity and federalism and is premised on the belief that a state proceeding provides a sufficient forum for federal constitutional claims.” Schlagler v. Phillips, 166 F.3d 439, 442 (2d Cir. 1999). Hence, only “ ‘in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith,’ ” Diamond “D” Const. Corp., 282 F.3d at 199 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971)), or “if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ render the state court incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it, can there be any relaxation of the deference to be accorded to the state criminal process,” id. at 201 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975)). Although “[t]he very nature of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ ... makes it impossible to anticipate and define every situation that might create a sufficient threat of such great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in state criminal proceedings,” at the very least, “such circumstances must be ‘extraordinary’ in the sense of creating an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief.” Id. (quoting Kugler, 421 U.S. at 124-25, 95 S.Ct. 1524).

Younger abstention ordinarily applies to a state court’s bail application proceedings. See Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400, 405-06 (2d Cir. 1975). Accordingly, absent bad faith or extraordinary circumstances, it would not be appropriate for us to grant a writ in this case. Jordan argues that her prolonged pretrial detention constitutes an extraordinary circumstance that warrants federal intervention. In light of the fact that a trial date has been set for early September, however, we are not persuaded that “an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief’ exists at this time. Diamond “D” Const. Corp., 282 F.3d at 201 (quoting Kugler, 421 U.S. at 125, 95 S.Ct. 1524).

Nevertheless, we note our concerns. Jordan has been detained for some 52 months. Although “[ljength of a detention period will rarely by itself offend due process,” United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1993), the length of pretrial incarceration here is highly troubling and, on its face, raises substantial questions. See United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 340 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting “at some point the length of confinement would exceed constitutional limits regardless of the circumstances”). Moreover, while Jordan is responsible for some of the delay, the prosecution likewise is responsible as well, as the trial court found. See Decision and Order, Aug. 2, 2013, at 2 (noting both parties “are responsible, to some degree, for the delay”); cf. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 342-43 (“It suffices ... to conclude that the Government, even if not deserving of blame, bears *45 a responsibility for a portion of the delay significant enough to add considerable weight to the defendants’ claim that the duration of detention has exceeded constitutional limits.”). Finally, we note our concern with two arguments advanced by the prosecution, that (1) nothing Jordan might propose in a bail application would be sufficient to overcome her risk of flight, and (2) no period of delay would constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant intervention by a federal court. Although we do not decide these issues now, we note our skepticism.

In sum, because trial has been tentatively set for early September, we do not, at this time, find extraordinary circumstances that create a pressing need for federal relief. Therefore, pursuant to Younger, we abstain from reaching Jordan’s due process claim. In light of our concerns, however, we note that if trial does not commence by October 1, 2014, extraordinary circumstances may make the issuance of a writ granting bail appropriate. Accordingly, the final order of the district court is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the refiling of a habeas petition in the district court in the event of further delay.