SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-Appellants Belmont Holdings Corporation, Norbert G. Kaess, Maria Farruggio, and Edward P. Zemprelli (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit on behalf of *59 themselves and others similarly situated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Batts, J.), alleging violations of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1938 by certain Deutsche Bank entities, individual defendants, underwriters, and auditor KPMG International (collectively, “DB” or “Defendants”). Though the district court initially granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint (“CAC”), in the wake of our decision in Fait v. Regions Financial Corporation, 655 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2011), Defendants moved for reconsideration, which the district court granted, dismissing the CAC in its entirety and entering judgment for Defendants.

Plaintiffs now appeal from (1) the August 9, 2012 memorandum and order and the August 17, 2012 judgment dismissing the CAC with prejudice, and (2) the May 15, 2013 denial of their motion for reconsideration and request for leave to file a Third Consolidated Amended Complaint (“TCAC”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

“We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 715 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘We review the district court’s denial of a postjudgment motion for leave to replead for abuse of discretion.” Williams v. Citigroup Inc., 659 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2011).

With respect to the dismissal of the CAC, the district court was correct to hold that DB’s estimation of the extent of its investment in and exposure to residential mortgage-backed securities, as well as its statements about its Value-at-Risk (“VaR”) metrics, amounted only to statements of opinion. See Fait at 655 F.3d at 110-11 (“Estimates of goodwill depend on management’s determination of the fair value of the assets acquired and liabilities assumed, which are not matters of objective fact.... In other words, the statements regarding goodwill at issue here are subjective ones rather than objective factual matters.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As such, to have survived a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs needed to have alleged that Defendants’ statements about market risk, proprietary lending risk, and exposure to the real estate market were “both objectively false and disbelieved by the defendants] at the time [these statements] w[ere] expressed.” Id. at 110. There are no allegations in the CAC that DB disbelieved its own disclosures about credit trading, market risk and its exposure to the subprime and non-prime markets, or its own VaR metrics and internal valuation models. Further, though Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were under an affirmative obligation to disclose their Q20 billion exposure to non-prime and subprime assets, there is no requirement that offering documents identify every type of asset that a security contains. See Hunt v. Alliance N. Am. Gov’t Income Trust, Inc., 159 F.3d 723, 730 (2d Cir. 1998) (declining to require more particularized disclosures even though the specific type of asset at issue allegedly posed far greater risk than the general category of assets described, and holding that the challenged prospectuses “contained disclosures broad enough to cover these instruments”). Thus, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the CAC.

We also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion, brought pursuant to Rules 59 *60 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which asked the district court to set aside the judgment, reconsider its prior decision, and grant Plaintiffs leave to file a TCAC. Where “a party does not seek leave to file an amended complaint until after judgment is entered, Rule 15’s liberality must be tempered by considerations of finality.” Williams, 659 F.3d at 213. The district court correctly held that there was no intervening change in controlling law between the court’s August 2012 decision and judgment and Plaintiffs’ September 2012 motion for reconsideration. And, as noted by the district court, the “new” evidence Plaintiffs claimed to incorporate had been available prior to entry of the August 2012 judgment. As such, Plaintiffs did not meet the strict standard governing applications for reconsideration or for setting aside the August 2012 judgment. See Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (“It is well-settled that Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1805, 185 L.Ed.2d 812 (2013).

We have considered the remainder of Plaintiffs’ arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.