SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Amy Weissbrod, an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and on immunity grounds, and from the District Court’s order denying reconsideration. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

A district court has the inherent authority to dismiss an action as frivolous, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee. Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam). An action is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). We ordinarily afford special solicitude to pro se litigants, but, as an attorney, Weissbrod is not entitled to liberal construction of her pleadings. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010). Although we have not decided whether such sua sponte dismissals are reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, we need not reach that issue here because the District Court’s decision “easily passes muster under the more rigorous de novo review,” Fitzgerald, 221 F.3d at 364 n. 2.

After review of Weissbrod’s complaint and relevant case law, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court in its May 2, 2013 order. Weissbrod complains principally of injuries caused by a state court judgment ordering her to pay a fine and temporarily suspending her from the practice of law. Yet the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars any attempt by Weissbrod to disturb these disciplinary orders. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2005). Moreover, Weissbrod’s claims seeking damages, among other forms of relief, against the defendants in their individual and official capacities were properly dismissed on the grounds of absolute and sovereign immunity. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985); Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 529 (2d Cir. 1993).

Weissbrod argues further that the District Court erred by denying her request for leave to amend, but she failed to make any substantive argument in support of that contention. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998). In any event, granting leave to amend would have been futile in light of the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and sovereign and judicial immunity. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Weissbrod on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the Dis *20 trict Court’s May 14, 2013 judgment. 1