SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Anthony Parinello, pro se, appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment, dismissing his employment discrimination action. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). On summary judgment, the court must consider “not whether ... the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, “[wjhen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court *33 should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

Upon such review, we conclude that Parinello’s appeal is without merit substantially for the reasons articulated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned order. Parinello v. Bausch & Lomb, No. 10-cv-6519, 2013 WL 1680152 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2013). We have considered all of Parinello’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.