SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-Appellees Tiffany (NJ) LLC and Tiffany and Company (the “plaintiffs”) brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York asserting, inter alia, claims for trademark infringement against nine identified defendants plus unidentified John Does and ABC Companies (collectively “defendants”) that allegedly produced and sold counterfeit products. On August 3, 2011, the district court (Buchwald, J.) entered a preliminary injunction freezing the defendants’ assets. The preliminary injunction specifically listed five accounts located at China Merchants Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Bank of China (collectively, the third-party “Banks”). Tiffany provided the Banks with notice of the preliminary injunction at their New York branches. The Banks subsequently moved to modify the preliminary injunction so that it would not apply to accounts held in China and the plaintiffs cross-moved to compel compliance. On May 23, 2012, the district court denied the motion to modify and granted Tiffany’s cross-motion to compel compliance with the asset freeze provisions of the preliminary injunction. 1 This appeal followed. *552 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Simultaneously with this summary order we decide, by opinion, Gucci America, Inc. v. Bank of China, Nos. 11-8934; 12-4557, which was argued in tandem with this case. The legal issues decided in Gucci substantially overlap with the legal issues presented here, and we therefore incorporate the legal analysis in Gucci relevant to this summary order.

I. Asset Freeze Injunction

The Banks first challenge the district court’s authority to issue the preliminary injunction freezing the defendants’ assets. The Banks argue that the asset freeze injunction was impermissible because: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Bank to issue it; and (2) the court lacked the equitable authority pursuant to Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 119 S.Ct. 1961, 144 L.Ed.2d 319 (1999), to do so. As to both arguments, we disagree.

Relying on the analysis set forth in Gucci, we reject the Banks’ argument that personal jurisdiction over the Banks was necessary for the district court to issue the asset freeze injunction. Because the injunctions at issue “do not directly enjoin payment system participants [such as banks], it is irrelevant whether the district court has personal jurisdiction over them.” NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 727 F.3d 230, 243 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2819 (2014). Once a district court issues an asset freeze injunction against parties over whom it has personal jurisdiction, the injunction “automatically forbids others — who are not directly enjoined but who act ‘in active concert or participation’ with an enjoined party— from assisting in a violation of the injunction.” NML Capital, 727 F.3d at 243 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)). Therefore, only personal jurisdiction over the defendants— which is not contested on appeal — was required to issue the asset freeze injunction.

Moreover, we also conclude that the district court had the equitable authority to issue the prejudgment asset freeze, relying again on the analysis in Gucci. The Supreme Court in Grupo Mexicano was careful not to abrogate the settled principle that in an action for equitable remedies, courts have the inherent authority to issue prejudgment asset freezes. See 527 U.S. at 325, 119 S.Ct. 1961 (noting that “preliminary relief available in a suit seeking equitable relief has nothing to do with the preliminary relief available in a creditor’s bill seeking ... a legal debt”). In this case, Tiffany’s complaint includes a request, under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1501, et seq., for an “accounting and disgorgement of Defendants’ illicit profits.” J.A. 45. In accordance with our holding in Gucci — and well settled Supreme Court precedent — a claim for an accounting of profits under the Lanham Act is equitable in nature. Therefore, the district court had the equitable authority to issue a prejudgment asset freeze in this case.

II. Order Enforcing Asset Freeze Injunction Against Banks

In addition to issuing a preliminary injunction freezing the defendants’ assets, the district court denied the Banks’ motions to modify the injunction and specifically compelled the Banks to comply with the asset freeze provisions in the prelimi *553 nary injunction. We vacate this portion of the May 23, 2012 order and remand for the district court to: (1) consider whether it has personal jurisdiction necessary to order the Banks to comply with the asset freeze; and (2) apply principles of international comity before deciding whether to order the Banks to comply.

While jurisdiction over a defendant is all that a court needs to issue an injunction freezing that party’s assets, a district court can enforce an injunction against a nonparty only if it has personal jurisdiction over that nonparty. See Canterbury Belts Ltd. v. Lane Walker Rudkin, Ltd., 869 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1989). Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014), and for the reasons stated in Gucci, the Banks were not subject to general jurisdiction in the district court. The Banks’ sites of incorporation and principal places of business are all outside of the United States. See J.A. 810 (China Merchants Bank branches); J.A. 857-61 (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China branches); Gucci ECF No. 288 (citing OCC Evaluation Aug. 18, 2008) (“At year-end 2007, [Bank of China] had 10,145 domestic branches, 689 overseas branches and subsidiaries in 27 countries around the world and 1200 correspondent banks.” Id. at 1): J.A. 863 (Bank of China branches in the United States). And there is no basis on which to conclude that the Banks’ contacts in New York are so “continuous and systematic,” judged against their national and global activities, that they are “essentially at home” in that state. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761. Thus, the district court erred in exercising general jurisdiction over the Banks.

But as in Gucci, the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction here rested on the only recently abrogated principle that the presence of the Banks’ branches in New York subjected them to general jurisdiction. Accordingly, the district court had no reason to consider, or to develop the record as to, whether it could properly assert specific jurisdiction over the Banks, or whether the Banks consented to jurisdiction by applying for authorization to conduct business in New York and designating the New York Secretary of State as their agent for service of process. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 1301(a), 1304(a)(6); N.Y. Banking Law § 200; Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075 (1916) (Cardozo, J.). We therefore vacate the May 23 order requiring the Banks to comply with the asset freeze injunction and remand for the district court to determine, in accordance with the principles we outline in Gucci, whether it may properly exercise jurisdiction over the Banks for the purpose of compelling their compliance with the asset freeze.

In the event that the district court determines that it has personal jurisdiction over the Banks, it should also consider, before exercising such jurisdiction, whether it should do so, considering principles of international comity. As we hold today in Gucci, before a district court may enforce an asset freeze injunction extraterritorially against a third-party foreign bank in a way that would cause the bank to violate its own domestic law, principles of comity require the court to conduct an analysis drawing upon the factors provided by § 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, entitled “Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe.” As in Gucci, the Banks here assert a conflict between their domestic law and the asset freeze injunction. In particular, they assert that complying with the injunction and freezing the defendants’ assets would violate Chinese law. Before ordering the Banks *554 nonetheless to comply with the asset freeze, the district court failed to conduct a comity analysis with reference to the factors in § 403, relying instead on its previous comity analysis regarding the production of documents. For this additional reason we vacate and remand the district court’s order.

We have reviewed Appellants’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.