SUMMARY ORDER

Bernabé Encarnación appeals from the August 27, 2012 decision and order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Larimer, J.) sua sponte dismissing his action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We lack jurisdiction over Encarnacion’s appeal because it is taken from a nonfinal order. With several exceptions not appli *20 cable here, a district court order is appeal-able only if the district court enters a final order. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final order is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Coopers & Lyb-rand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). We lack jurisdiction over an appeal where, as here, the district court enters final judgment despite overlooking claims contained in the complaint. See United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., 762 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2014).

The district court decision and order is silent as to Encarnacion’s allegations that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. There is no apparent explanation for the district’s court’s silence, and its ruling on Encarnacion’s double jeopardy claim is unrelated to his Eighth Amendment claim. If the district court intended to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claims as well, then it may clarify its reasons for dismissal, and re-enter final judgment. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment claim will likely proceed to final adjudication. Either of those scenarios would establish a jurisdictional basis for a subsequent appeal.

Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.