SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-appellant Rochelle Driessen, proceeding pro se, appeals from the judgment entered October 29, 2013, dismissing her complaint, which asserted claims under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. By decision filed October 25, 2013, the district court granted the motion of defendants National Westminster Bank PLC and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. (12)(b)(6). On appeal, Driessen argues that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint and in failing to grant her summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision.

We review Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, “accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 715 (2d Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Courts should read pro se complaints with “special solicitude” and interpret them “to raise the strongest [claims] that [they] suggest.” Hill v. Curcione, 657 *33 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (first alteration, in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, courts should not deny leave to amend a pro se complaint unless amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).

We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned memorandum decision. The complaint alleged that Dries-sen had been notified by email that she had won two European lotteries, and that the defendant banks violated the EFTA by failing to transfer her lottery winnings to her bank account. For the reasons explained by the district court, the complaint did not plausibly allege that the banks had any actual involvement with the purported emails or lottery winnings.

We have considered Driessen’s remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.